The future of the eurozone and gold. CEPS Special Report, 3 September 2010 by Alcidi, Cinzia et al.
 
 
The Future 
of the Eurozone 
and Gold 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cinzia Alcidi 
Paul De Grauwe 
Daniel Gros  
Yonghyup Oh 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) 
Brussels 
The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) is an independent policy research institute 
based in Brussels. Its mission is to produce sound analytical research leading to 
constructive solutions to the challenges facing Europe today.  
This publication presents the findings of the study “The Future of the Eurozone and Gold” 
undertaken during the summer of 2010, for which support from the World Gold Council is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
The authors wish to thank Isabelle Justo and Katharina Weddige-Haaf for their excellent 
research assistance and GFMS for the provision of data on the demand and supply of 
gold. 
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors writing in a personal capacity 
and do not necessarily reflect those of CEPS or any other institution with which the 
authors are associated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN 978-94-6138-045-6 
© Copyright 2010, Centre for European Policy Studies. 
 
 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or 
transmitted in any form or by any means – electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or 
otherwise – without the prior permission of the Centre for European Policy Studies. 
 
Centre for European Policy Studies 
Place du Congrès 1, B-1000 Brussels 
Tel: 32 (0) 2 229.39.11 Fax: 32 (0) 2 219.41.51 
e-mail: info@ceps.eu 
internet: http://www.ceps.eu Contents 
1.  Introduction .................................................................................................. 1 
2.  The economics of gold..................................................................................... 3 
2.1  Stylised facts ......................................................................................... 3 
2.2  Gold correlations .................................................................................... 8 
3.  The eurozone and the euro ............................................................................ 12 
3.1  The state of the eurozone ...................................................................... 12 
3.2  The euro as a reserve currency and government debt................................ 14 
4.  Scenario-building: Driving factors and forces.................................................... 17 
5.  Possible scenarios for the eurozone................................................................. 21 
5.1  Eurozone dream scenario....................................................................... 21 
5.2  Muddling-through scenario..................................................................... 23 
5.3  Double-dip scenario .............................................................................. 25 
5.4  Doomsday scenario............................................................................... 28 
6.  Implications of the scenarios.......................................................................... 30 
7.  Conclusions ................................................................................................. 34 
Bibliography ...................................................................................................... 36 
Appendix 1. Summary of Eurobond proposals......................................................... 38 
Appendix 2. List of abbreviations.......................................................................... 40 
 
 List of Figures 
Figure 1.  Linkages between gold, the euro area and global economics .....................2 
Figure 2.  Gold price in US dollars per ounce (based on the London pm fix) 
(1974–2010)......................................................................................3 
Figure 3.  Prices of gold, oil and silver in US dollars, 1974–2010 (1974=100) ............4 
Figure 4.  Supply of gold (total and scrap) and world GDP ......................................5 
Figure 5.  Demand for gold (fabrication and non-fabrication) and world GDP growth...5 
Figure 6.  Shares of total consumer demand (i.e. jewellery and net investment) 
for gold per region (2003–09)...............................................................6 
Figure 7.  Gold official purchases, in selected emerging market countries..................7 
Figure 8.  Correlation between the gold price and the US inflation rate (1974–2010) ..8 
Figure 9.  Correlation between the gold price and the global money supply 
(M2 in G4 countries), monthly changes..................................................9 
Figure 10.  Correlation between the gold price and the US dollar exchange rate 
(1974–2010).................................................................................... 10 
Figure 11.  Correlation between the gold price and Standard & Poor’s 500 Composite 
Index (1974–2010)........................................................................... 11 
Figure 12.  Sovereign spread in selected euro area countries and the gold price......... 12 
Figure 13.  Quasi-risk-free securities at the end of 2008......................................... 15 
Figure 14.  Nominal exchange rate and exports in the euro area.............................. 19 
Figure 15.  ECB: Narrow and broad money........................................................... 20 
Figure 16.  Domestic demand growth rates........................................................... 23 
Figure 17.  Nominal effective exchange rate of the euro and the US$/€ exchange rate 
(1999=100)..................................................................................... 24 
Figure 18.  Change in the real exchange rate by country (real harmonised 
competitiveness indicator unit labour cost deflated)............................... 25 
Figure 19.  M1 and loans to non-financial corporations ........................................... 26 
Figure 20.  The ECB’s refinancing for banks and deposit facility ............................... 27 
Figure 21.  Ten-year government bond rates in the eurozone.................................. 30 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1.  Average daily trading volumes in 2009 (US$ billions)............................. 17 
Table 2.  Net financing provided by the ECB (and the Eurosystem) to banks  
across the euro area (in € billions) ...................................................... 28 
Table 3.  Implications of eurozone scenarios for the rest of the world and gold ....... 34 
 
 | 1 
The Future of the Eurozone and Gold 
1.  Introduction 
The sovereign debt problem of the eurozone that surfaced in late 2009 made clear that 
the global financial crisis and economic recession are not over. In early May 2010, 
European leaders agreed to set up a financial stability mechanism, with a commitment to 
provide liquidity close to $1 trillion in total.
1 While this action took some by surprise, it 
certainly sent a strong signal to the market and helped extinguish the fire in the 
government bond markets – at least for the time being. Yet these fire-extinguishing 
operations were too late to prevent the development of a crisis that is essentially a 
eurozone banking crisis. The banking sector is now under close scrutiny and a large 
number of eurozone banks have been forced to take stress tests; the results and the 
information disclosure that they imply will be important for the future of the eurozone.  
Since 2001, gold has outperformed many asset classes and is back in vogue, especially 
since the onset of the financial crisis of 2007 because investors view it as an alternative 
to fiat money or complex financial papers that are difficult to price. 
The main purpose of this report is to analyse the implications of potential eurozone 
developments for the gold market. To this end, we address issues directly related to 
current eurozone conditions and explore possible scenarios for the eurozone economies 
in the near future. 
We analyse four scenarios
2  for the future of the eurozone, ranging from the most 
optimistic to the most pessimistic. The first scenario, labelled the ‘dream scenario’, refers 
to a situation in which the eurozone’s financial problems are resolved and quickly backed 
by real economic recovery. The second one, ‘muddling through’, is a scenario in which 
the eurozone experiences a mild recovery, but problems remain and it takes time to get 
rid of structural weaknesses in the eurozone economy. The third scenario, ‘double-dip’ 
refers to the onset of a new recession: owing to premature exit strategies from 
exceptional monetary measures or other exogenous shocks, the eurozone is drawn into 
another recession. The last one, the ‘doomsday’ scenario, refers to a case in which the 
eurozone actually breaks up. We describe each of these scenarios and draw implications 
for eurozone growth, financial markets, inflation rates and euro exchange rates. We do 
not attempt, however, to give the probability of each of these scenarios.  
In order to analyse the implications of the different eurozone scenarios for the gold 
market, we look at how the situations described would impact on the rest of the world. 
The global gold market is influenced by a set of determinants that are driven not only by 
what happens in the eurozone directly but also indirectly by the repercussions on global 
conditions. Our analysis therefore additionally attempts to trace the effects of the 
different scenarios on the global macroeconomic variables that matter for the gold 
market.  
The analysis of the implications of the scenarios is structured along two main lines of 
reasoning. First, the euro is an international currency and more specifically a reserve 
currency. Macroeconomic instability and more importantly the perceived increasing risk 
of a break-up of the monetary union would significantly affect the demand for alternative 
reserve assets by central banks, namely dollars and gold. There are actually two 
dimensions to this story. When central banks hold foreign exchange reserves, they 
usually invest these holdings in (quasi-) risk-free, liquid assets (so the assets can be 
                                          
1 See Box 1 for a detailed description.  
2 Some of the elements included in the scenarios are drawn from “The State of the Union” by Ralph 
Atkins in the Financial Times (31 May 2010). 2 | ALCIDI, DE GRAUWE, GROS & OH 
 
mobilised quickly for interventions in the foreign exchange market at no cost). At the 
global level the assets are largely represented by securities issued (or guaranteed) by 
governments, notably US treasuries as well as debt issued by euro area governments. 
The sovereign debt crisis in the euro area involves both of these dimensions of reserve 
assets. Official investors fear both the risk of insolvency of euro area governments
3 and a 
fall in the international purchasing power of the euro. Second, gold being a global asset 
in a global market, its price is affected by a variety of factors, such as growth in the 
different regions of the world, global liquidity and the US dollar exchange rate. Figure 1 
summarises the linkages between macroeconomics and the gold market. 
Figure 1. Linkages between gold, the euro area and global economics 
 
This report proceeds as follows. The next section describes the main drivers of supply 
and demand for gold and regularities in gold price dynamics by reviewing important 
stylised facts and highlighting new trends that have emerged in recent years. Section 3 
briefly summarises the most recent events in the eurozone, takes stock of the current 
situation and discusses the role of the euro in the global reserve system. Section 4 
presents in detail the core contribution of this study: the construction and assessment of 
the four scenarios. Before moving on to outline the individual scenarios, the key 
economic factors and forces driving the scenarios are individually discussed. Alternative 
developments in each of them and their mutual interactions are depicted in the four 
different scenarios in section 5. Section 6 is devoted to the analysis of the potential 
implications of the scenarios. It includes some considerations of the likely effects of the 
scenarios on the global economy and reactions by the world’s main central banks, 
namely the European Central Bank (ECB), the Federal Reserve Bank and the People’s 
Bank of China. This completes the background for drawing the implications of each of the 
scenarios for the gold market. Section 7 concludes.  
                                          
3 Note that non-euro area central banks do not hold euro area debt in an indiscriminate fashion. 
They target AAA government securities. Although statistics are not available, there is a consensus 
that official investors in emerging markets, those with the largest reserve holdings, invest mainly in 
German and French sovereign debt. 
Euro & eurozone 
developments 
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2.  The economics of gold  
The gold price is a complex variable. Because demand for gold is driven by various 
motives that are sensitive to macroeconomic conditions in different regions of the world, 
its dynamics are difficult to anticipate but also to fully explain. The next section provides 
an account of the main stylised facts.  
2.1   Stylised facts 
Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s and the end of the 
system of fixed exchange rates, the gold price has followed a clear, long-term upward 
trend accompanied by short-run, sometimes wide, fluctuations (see Figure 2). During the 
1970s, the gold price rose on the waves of international turbulence linked to the Iran–
Iraq war, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the second oil crisis and the resulting 
increase in inflation in Western countries. Since 2001, the price of gold has risen sharply, 
maintained by a relatively weak supply of gold.
4  Geopolitical tensions since the 11 
September terrorist attacks, the emergence of new markets in developing economies, 
growing speculation about the large US current-account imbalances and the required 
correction through a significant depreciation of the dollar have contributed to the upward 
trend and higher volatility.  
Figure 2. Gold price in US dollars per ounce (based on the London pm fix) (1974–2010) 
 
Note: Real gold price at 1974 prices, deflated by the US consumer price index. 
Sources: World Gold Council and Federal Reserve Economic Data. 
 
The weakness of the dollar and the US being first hit by the crisis in summer 2007 led to 
a rise from $665 per ounce in July 2007 to $968 per ounce in March 2008. After that, the 
price fell as a consequence of depressed demand at the global level and developing 
countries scrapping old gold to sustain their income. Then two other sequences of price 
increases began. The first one was mainly prompted by fears over inflation fuelled by an 
                                          
4  Gold producers reduced their hedge books from 2001 to 2004, and a decline in official sales 
occurred in 2004. See the gold price chronology 1971–2007.  4 | ALCIDI, DE GRAUWE, GROS & OH 
 
expanding money supply. The second one picked up around the start of 2010, driven by 
the rebound of demand for jewellery coming from India, central bank purchases (while 
the signatories to the third Central Bank Gold Agreement almost stopped their net sales) 
and the sovereign debt crisis in peripheral eurozone countries. The price of gold hit new 
highs, with the monthly price (based on the London pm fix) at $1,127 per ounce in 
November 2009 and above the $1,200 barrier in June 2010.  
As shown in Figure 2, since the eruption of the financial crisis in late summer 2007, the 
gold price has almost doubled in nominal terms. But in real terms, it has not reached the 
record set in early 1980. Figure 3 suggests that other commodity prices, like oil and 
silver, have experienced a similar upward trend but with a different degree of volatility. 
Figure 3. Prices of gold, oil and silver in US dollars, 1974–2010 (1974=100) 
 
Note: Nominal prices in US dollars with initial prices normalised to 100. 
Sources: World Gold Council, London Bullion Market Association and Federal Reserve Economic Data. 
Historically, the gold price and the silver price tend to move closely and the distance 
between the two has been relatively stable for more than two decades. The co-
movements are explained by both silver demand (mainly coming from industry) and 
some components of gold demand (like jewellery and industry) being pro-cyclical in 
nature. Since 2007, however, this distance has widened significantly as the gold price 
has increased at a much faster pace than the silver price. The main reason for this is that 
unlike silver, gold is also a store of value. When this motive for gold demand prevails 
gold price can deviate considerably from silver price movements. 
This brings us to the analysis of the main drivers of supply and demand for gold.  
While gold production from mines is relatively price inelastic and does not change 
abruptly, demand can be subject to rapid changes and can be satisfied to some extent by 
existing stocks. The most volatile component of the supply of gold is scrap. This 
component tends to behave in a counter-cyclical fashion: in times of economic downturn 
or recession, people swap their gold jewellery for cash in order to sustain income (see 
Figure 4). Yet during 2009, data from India, one of the most important markets for 
jewellery, indicate an increase in the jewellery sold to dealers despite not showing a fall 
in income. Most likely the escalation in the price of gold combined with uncertainty about 
whether this trend will continue provided a strong incentive to sell gold.  THE FUTURE OF THE EUROZONE AND GOLD | 5 
 
Figure 4. Supply of gold (total and scrap) and world GDP 
 
Sources: GFMS and World Economic Outlook (April 2010). 
In general terms, demand is relatively more volatile than supply – which is one reason 
for price volatility. Given its different uses, gold demand is driven by various motives that 
are sensitive to the macroeconomic environment in diverse fashions and can even affect 
the price in opposite directions. The main drivers of gold demand are fabrication 
(jewellery and industry) and investment, private and official. As shown in Figure 5, 
jewellery and industrial demand tend to be pro-cyclical, while investment demand can 
decouple from the economic cycle.   
Figure 5. Demand for gold (fabrication and non-fabrication) and world GDP growth 
 
Notes:  Fabrication includes jewellery, industry and coins. Non-fabrication is residual demand and includes 
investment, bar hoarding and net official purchases. 
Sources: GFMS and World Economic Outlook database, April 2010. 
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In times when uncertainty about the return on conventional investment increases, 
investment in gold becomes more attractive regardless of the fact that gold offers neither 
a dividend nor a coupon. This has especially been the case in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis of 2007–08. The crisis showed an inherent fallacy in the financial system: 
its inability to price sophisticated financial papers, which has induced some investors to 
shift towards tangible assets, and given the recent bust in the housing market, gold has 
turned out to be an appealing option. 
An important element to keep in mind is that neither the eurozone nor the US is primarily 
the biggest source of demand for gold.
5 As shown in Figure 6, total consumer demand for 
gold (i.e. gold bought by individuals, which excludes official sector purchases) primarily 
comes from India, China and o n l y  t o  a  l e s s e r  e x t e n t  f r o m  t h e  U S  a n d  E u r o p e .  I n  
particular, over the past five years (2005–09), 63% of the demand was for jewellery and 
came mainly from India, China, Turkey and the Middle East.
6   Thus to gain an 
understanding of gold demand dynamics, it is crucial to follow closely developments in 
Asian economic growth.  
Figure 6.  Shares of total consumer demand (i.e. jewellery and net investment) for gold 
per region (2003–09) 
 
Notes: The Greater China region comprises Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. The figures for Europe do 
not include jewellery. 
Sources: World Gold Council and GFMS. 
Because gold is a ‘hard’ asset, its purchase is also driven by hedging motives. Even if the 
gold price tends to be volatile and therefore gold is not a risk-free asset, it is an 
extremely liquid asset. Moreover, its purchasing power increases when the purchasing 
power of international (reserve) currencies declines. This is notably the case in times of 
high inflation or financial and macroeconomic instability in the country(ies) supplying 
international currencies. For these same properties, although gold does not have any 
formal role in the present global financial system, it continues to be used by central 
                                          
5 The US and Europe matter mostly for the investment. 
6 See GFMS for a regional breakdown of demand data. THE FUTURE OF THE EUROZONE AND GOLD | 7 
 
banks as a reserve asset. In Western countries, central banks’ gold holdings showed a 
steady decline after the 1970s, but following the eruption of the crisis central banks 
turned from being net sellers to net buyers. At present gold represents 71% of total US 
foreign exchange reserves and 58%
7 of the total holdings of the eurozone (i.e. national 
central banks plus the ECB). As shown in Figure 7 some central banks in emerging 
markets, which are now the largest holders of foreign reserves, have been increasing 
their holdings of gold in recent years. Their current gold holdings are still small, but the 
key question is whether they could be induced to diversify more into gold if their 
confidence in the euro as an alternative to the dollar deteriorates. At present, it is 
estimated that China’s gold holdings amount to about 2%
8  of its total reserve assets 
(equivalent to roughly $2.5 trillion) but around 20% of them are in euro-denominated 
assets. It is thus clear that the potential increase in gold demand by Asian central banks 
could be very large indeed if they were to switch even only a fraction of their euro 
holdings into gold. 
Figure 7. Gold official purchases, in selected emerging market countries 
 
Note: The purchase of 454 tonnes of gold by China, announced in April 2009, took place over the six-year 
period 2003–09. 
Source: World Gold Council. 
Overall, it emerges that macroeconomic conditions affect gold market dynamics in a 
complex way. The literature has attempted to disentangle these factors by identifying 
historical regularities in the behaviour of the gold price.
9 The most relevant variables are 
growth, the US inflation rate, the global money supply and the US dollar exchange rate. 
There is also some evidence that measures approximating political and financial risks 
contribute to explaining short-run volatility. 
                                          
7 The eurozone and the US are the largest official holders of gold, i.e. about 20,000 tonnes or more 
than 60% of the world holdings.  
8 See the World Gold Council website publications on reserve asset statistics, in particular the world 
ranking of official gold holdings (http://www.gold.org/). 
9 See Levin & Wright (2006), Starr & Tran (2007), Attié & Roache (2009) and Artigas (2010). 8 | ALCIDI, DE GRAUWE, GROS & OH 
 
The next section illustrates some stylised facts in terms of the correlation between the 
gold price and relevant macroeconomic variables.  
2.2  Gold correlations 
As mentioned earlier, a broad consensus exists about gold acting as a hedge against 
inflation. Figure 8 shows the rolling one-year correlation
10  between the monthly gold 
price denominated in US dollars and US inflation.  
Figure 8. Correlation between the gold price and the US inflation rate (1974–2010) 
 
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF) (International Financial Statistics database) and World Gold 
Council. 
On average, a positive relationship holds, even if over some specific periods the sign 
becomes strongly negative. This was the case at the beginning of the 1980s when 
several geopolitical events materialised and affected the world’s financial markets and 
gold price. Similarly over 1988–89, the appreciation of the US dollar
11 and the higher 
supply of gold generated downward pressures on the gold price despite almost flat 
inflation. Between end-1991 and end-1993, and again in 1998, long-standing low and 
negative levels of correlation can be observed. In 1991 inflation fell abruptly while the 
gold price stayed relatively stable, and in 1993 the gold price increased slightly owing to 
inflation fears, but at the same time tighter monetary policy started to reduce inflation. 
Then in 1997, in the aftermath of the Asian crisis and a reduction in gold demand its 
price also fell, while inflation started to rise again after a long period of decline. Another 
negative spike emerged after the dot-com bust of the early 2000s. In 2002 inflation 
started to fall in the US while the gold price picked up driven by strong investment 
                                          
10 The correlation is calculated between the monthly percentage changes of each set of series on 
intervals of 12-month periods. The date shown on the horizontal axis represents the middle date; it 
therefore represents both past and future trends. 
11 The 12-month rolling correlation between the gold price and the US dollar exchange rate reached 
-0.56 on average over the period 1988–89, with a negative peak at -0.76.  THE FUTURE OF THE EUROZONE AND GOLD | 9 
 
demand in advanced economies on the wave of diminishing returns on stocks and 
growing global uncertainty.  
During 2008, a sharp drop in the level of correlation occurred again. Like 2002, this was 
largely the effect of the financial crisis and the high degree of uncertainty in financial 
markets. 
As a response to the financial crisis of 2007, unprecedented liquidity-easing measures
12 
were put in place by the main central banks (the ECB, the Federal Reserve, the Bank of 
England and the Bank of Japan) to avoid a financial meltdown. This response was 
reflected in an accelerated increase in liquidity: the annual M2 money supply of the G4 
(the US, the UK, the eurozone and Japan) grew on average from 9% to 15% between 
mid-2006 and mid-2008. 
Loose monetary policies and increasing global liquidity tend to generate positive 
expectations of inflation and therefore to affect the gold price before inflation materialises 
or even if it does not materialise. As shown in Figure 9, gold and the world money supply 
have mostly been moving in the same direction with an average coefficient of 0.40 
between growth in the money supply and changes in the gold price. There have been a 
few exceptions, mainly during the 1990s. The lowest level was reached in the period 
1993–94, when the decline in the US money supply to fight inflation fears met an 
increase in the gold price due to the lack of central banks’ sales and strong demand 
driven precisely by inflation expectations.  
Figure  9. Correlation between the gold price and the global money supply (M2 in G4 
countries), monthly changes 
 
Notes:  The global money supply is defined as the sum of M2 money for the G4: the euro area, Japan, the UK 
and the US, in US$ billions. The chart starts in 1988 due to data shortcomings (the lack of M2 
aggregate for the UK).  
Sources: IMF (International Financial Statistics database), Federal Reserve Economic Data, Bank of England 
statistics, ECB (Statistical Data Warehouse) and the World Gold Council.  
                                          
12 The US started to lower its policy interest rate in September 2007, to reach a range of 0.0-
0.25%. The Bank of England closely followed the Federal Reserve’s policy. Reactions from the ECB 
and the Bank of Japan took place much later, in October 2008. 10 | ALCIDI, DE GRAUWE, GROS & OH 
 
Another variable with respect to which the gold price tends to show regular behaviour is 
the US dollar exchange rate. The gold price being denominated in US dollars, exchange 
rate movements are one of the sources of volatility observed in the gold price. As shown 
in Figure 10, the gold price is negatively correlated to the US dollar exchange rate 
against major currencies.
13  Indeed, a depreciation of the US dollar makes gold less 
expensive for investors outside the US, which induces a rise in the demand for gold and 
an increase in its price. Moreover, gold is a hedge against a weak dollar. Dollar 
depreciation implies a loss in the purchasing power of international investors, who 
therefore tend to shift their preferences in favour of an alternative asset like gold. There 
are a few exceptions to this expected behaviour. Interestingly they have corresponded to 
the deviations from the expected correlation between the gold price and inflation that we 
highlighted earlier, against the background of monetary policy decisions or external 
shocks.  
Figure 10.  Correlation between the gold price and the US dollar exchange rate (1974–
2010) 
 
Note: The US dollar exchange rate is defined as a weighted average of the foreign exchange value of the US 
dollar against the currencies of a broad group of major US trading partners (for more information about 
trade-weighted indexes, see http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2005/winter05_index.pdf).  
Sources: IMF (International Financial Statistics database), Federal Reserve Economic Data and World Gold 
Council. 
It may also be interesting to compare an indicator of the stock market with the gold 
price. Indeed, the return on a conventional investment like shares can be seen as the 
opportunity cost of holding gold. If the opportunity cost of holding gold were higher, 
investors would prefer assets that give greater returns, and would reduce their demand 
for gold. 
The literature is not clear on the existence of such a negative correlation. As shown in 
Figure 11, the correlation between gold and the S&P 500 has historically been low, but 
there is some evidence that the negative relationship holds particularly during short 
                                          
13 The US dollar exchange rate is defined as a weighted average of the foreign exchange value of 
the US dollar against the currencies of a broad group of major US trading partners. THE FUTURE OF THE EUROZONE AND GOLD | 11 
 
periods of high financial and political distress. Examples of it are the periods of October 
2007–September 2008 and November 2008–April 2010, when the rolling 12-month 
correlation between the gold price and the index was at -63% and -10% (on average), 
respectively.  
Figure  11. Correlation between the gold price and Standard & Poor’s 500 Composite 
Index (1974–2010) 
 
Sources: ECB (Statistical Data Warehouse) and World Gold Council. 
 
Overall, the correlations shown above seem to suggest that some regularity tends to hold 
over quite long periods, but there are also special times during which the sign of the 
correlation is reversed. Such a period has been observed since 2007. During this period, 
characterised by low inflation, increasing liquidity in the global market, economic 
recession and significant fluctuations in the US dollar, the gold price has experienced a 
sharp upward trend. 
It would be safe to say that high levels of global uncertainty and risk aversion have been 
the main drivers of this trend, often obscuring the effects of other macroeconomic 
variables. 
Lastly, to gain a sense of the role played by the eurozone sovereign-debt crisis at the 
global level, Figure 12 plots the high frequency (daily) sovereign spreads in some 
peripheral eurozone countries against the gold price. Although the period is quite short 
and care must be taken not to read too much into the results, the picture displays a 
positive and rather close correlation, suggesting that the impact of the risk surrounding 
the eurozone on the gold price may be not negligible. 12 | ALCIDI, DE GRAUWE, GROS & OH 
 
Figure 12. Sovereign spread in selected euro area countries and the gold price 
 
Note: Spreads are defined as the difference between the yields on five-year government bonds and the 
benchmark bond, i.e. five-year German Bund. 
Sources: Bloomberg and the World Gold Council. 
3.  The eurozone and the euro 
The worst financial crisis since the 1930s showed its first symptoms in the US in the late 
summer of 2007, reaching its peak in September 2008 with the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers. The crisis quickly took on a global dimension. At first there was no doubt that 
the epicentre of the crisis was the US and that emerging economies and good old Europe 
were merely victims of contagion spread by deep financial and commercial interlinkages 
with the US economy. As far as Europe is concerned, however, that assessment turned 
out to be wrong. While Europe has not experienced a widespread subprime crisis 
(although it has had its own subprime version: Greece) or any bank defaults, the 
European banking system is huge, highly integrated and inherently fragile. Several banks 
have already benefited from national governments’ financial support to avoid collapse. 
Since early 2010, the financial crisis has started to assume a different character in the 
eurozone, that of a sovereign debt crisis with a precise geographical connotation. It is 
now clear that the epicentre of the second act of the crisis could be the eurozone.  
3.1  The state of the eurozone  
One aspect that is often not well appreciated is that although in early 2010 the focus was 
on Greece and its profligate government, the fundamental condition for fixing the effects 
of the crisis is the recognition that the entire European banking system has a problem. In 
May 2010, euro area governments reached a historical agreement about pooling together 
€500 billion to create a rescue fund, through extended EU balance-of-payments 
assistance and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), for eurozone member 
states in financial distress (see Box 1).  
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Box 1. The European Stabilisation Mechanism 
On 9 May 2010, the European Stabilisation Mechanism (ESM) was created to preserve financial 
stability in Europe and especially to preserve or to restore the sustainability of public finances of 
the beneficiary member states. The ESM should allow the EU to respond to a financial crisis in a 
coordinated, rapid and effective manner by helping a country in financial distress, although its 
activation is subject to strong conditionality.  
The ESM consists of an aid package of up to €750 billion provided by three different entities: 
€60 billion by the EU (EU budget), €440 billion by the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) and up to €250 billion by the IMF.  
European resources will be depleted successively. In a first step, the EU – backed by the EU 
budget – can borrow up to €60 billion in financial markets and issue a loan to a member state in 
financial difficulty. The amount is available to all EU member states. In a second step, if the 
amount provided by the EU budget is depleted, the EFSF – established on 7 June 2010 for a 
period of three years (until 30 June 2013) – can provide additional financial aid up to €440 
billion. This is only available to members of the euro area.  
To finance the loans to the requesting member state, the EFSF will issue bonds (Eurobonds), 
notes, commercial papers, debt securities and other financing arrangements. These funding 
instruments will be backed by unconditional and irrevocable guarantees of euro-area member 
states on a pro-rata basis, amounting to a total of 120% of the amount raised in financial 
markets. This implies that the 16 countries will offer guarantees of up to €528 billion. This over-
collateralisation of the EFSF funds is necessary to ensure that if one or more countries steps 
out, there are still enough resources available. In fact when a country asks for help, its 
contribution disappears and the quota of the others increases proportionally. Yet the countries 
have put a ceiling on the possible increase in the national contribution, up to 120% of their 
quota. Some simple arithmetic suggests that this ceiling makes sure that if Greece (which has 
already stepped out), Ireland, Portugal and Spain step out, the commitment of the other 12 
countries still guarantees resources amounting to €440 billion, but in this case the extra 
guarantees would have vanished. A cash reserve will act as an additional cash buffer.  
The IMF is expected to participate in the financing arrangements, complementing the EU’s 
commitment by 50% of the EU’s contribution. 
 
Despite the impressive sum committed, the euphoria in the markets lasted no more than 
a single day. There are two main reasons market confidence was not restored by the 
agreement. First, country-specific problems, namely the Greek risk of insolvency and 
Spain’s bank losses related to the real estate bust, were not officially recognised as 
problems and therefore they were not properly addressed. Second, large swathes of the 
European banking system remain vastly undercapitalised. According to the statistics of 
the ECB, in the euro area’s banks the liabilities (including interbank debt) are about 20 
times larger than the capital (and reserves).  
If we assume that in the case of Greece losses amount to 50% of total government debt 
(i.e. €150 billion) and in the case of Spain 30% of its GDP (i.e. about €300 billion of 
housing overhang) (see Gros, 2010a), the EFSF would be amply sufficient to deal with all 
of these – provided these potential losses are clearly identified and the funds earmarked 
to deal with them. This has not been the approach followed so far, however.  
Instead, European funding is only supposed to bail out governments, which in turn need 
the money to bail out their banks. But given the 20:1 liability-to-capital ratio in the 
banking sector, this arrangement implies that the funding requirements to ensure the 
stability of the eurozone banking system could still become astronomical despite €450 
billion of potential losses. 14 | ALCIDI, DE GRAUWE, GROS & OH 
 
As the above discussion shows, a tough stress testing of euro area banks, followed by 
mandatory recapitalisation, would help reduce public funding rather than extend it 
through the provision of blanket guarantees to everybody.  
3.2  The euro as a reserve currency and government debt
14 
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the reasons the euro is under the spotlight is 
that the euro is an international and reserve currency. 
Traditionally a reserve system is defined by the currency around which it is centred and 
this currency plays two different roles: it provides a peg for the non-free-floating 
currencies while at the same time it is the currency in which official reserves are 
accumulated. In the present reserve system, the dollar is the dominant currency while 
the euro plays a second-fiddle role, without ever substantially threatening the supremacy 
of the dollar. 
Indeed there are practical obstacles to large-scale currency diversification that are not 
always appreciated.
15 Reserves being held in rather risk-free assets, the availability of 
deep and liquid markets for such assets denominated in the potential reserve currencies 
is a precondition for diversification. If we assume that bank deposits fit into this 
category, there does not seem to be any constraint on their availability: big international 
banks will be equally happy to accept deposits in dollars or euros. Yet in normal times at 
least, the remuneration on those assets will be lower than on marketable securities. 
Moreover, this crisis has shown that bank deposits may not always be viewed as being 
without risk. 
If one looks at the size of the market for the kinds of short-term, safe and liquid 
securities required by authorities for their currency reserves, the advantages of the US 
quickly become apparent. Of course, by its sheer size, the euro market of government 
debt securities looks comparable to that of the US.
16 But the US market of quasi-risk-free 
securities (government debt securities, government-sponsored enterprises (GSE) debt 
and agency-backed mortgage pools), which are also of interest to reserve holders, is 
much larger than any quasi-risk-free euro market.
17 Figure 13 shows that on this account 
the US market is more than double that of the euro area. 
                                          
14 See Alcidi et al. (2010). 
15  The past accumulation of reserves raises another ‘practical’ question. Given the accumulated 
amount, would a significant move out of the dollar into other currencies (the euro in particular) 
have disruptive consequences? The size of the international portfolios in place now makes this 
much less likely than just a few decades ago: during the last few years, cross-border capital flows 
have intensified and the size of the balance sheets of the different economies have increased 
significantly. Shifting some of the huge amount of reserves accumulated, say from the dollar to the 
euro, would of course put a downward pressure on the dollar. But provided such a move does not 
provoke a brutal change in exchange rate expectations – that is, provided it takes place in an 
orderly fashion – this pressure does not have to lead to a deep fall of the dollar against the euro.  
16 According to data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), as of December 2008 the 
outstanding amount of domestic government securities issued by euro area countries represented 
22% of the world’s public debt market, while Japan represented 30.6% and the US 26.5%. Despite 
its huge size, the Japanese government debt market offers limited potential for international 
investors for two main reasons: i) Japan’s prolonged current-account surpluses have made it 
possible for government debt to be held domestically and ii) public debt is largely held by domestic 
(private and public) financial institutions. 
17 In Europe, GSE securities do not exist, but Pfandbriefe-style instruments can be considered a 
close substitute. Hence the quasi-risk-free securities market in Europe includes government 
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Figure 13. Quasi-risk-free securities at the end of 2008 
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Notes:   Euro area-4 includes Germany, France, Italy and Spain. The exchange rate to convert euros into US 
dollars at the end of 2008 (ECB): $1.4 per €1. US quasi-risk-free securities include federal, state and 
local government securities, GSE debt, and agency- and GSE-backed mortgage pools, and are taken 
from the Fed Z1. 
Sources:  National agencies and treasuries. Data on covered bonds are from the European Covered Bonds 
Council (provisional statistics for issuance and outstanding covered bonds, August 2009). 
Furthermore, the European market for public debt is fragmented, and so are the markets 
for European covered bonds. The risk premia that have arisen in early 2010 on the 
markets for the public debt of several countries, notably Greece, provide evidence of the 
large differences in the quality of government securities across euro area members. In 
reality the size of the largest market for AAA-rated, euro-government securities, the 
German one, is less than a fifth that of the US. Even adding the only other large AAA 
country (France) yields a total asset supply of less than a third that of the US.
18 This 
suggests that, up to now at least, the euro area has not been playing in the same league 
as the US in terms of providing the liquid and safe assets demanded by the reserve-
accumulating authorities.  
One of the issues for the coming years is to find out whether this situation could change 
and euro-denominated securities could provide a valid alternative to the dollar-
denominated markets (see Box 2 on the possible effects of the introduction of 
Eurobonds). It is not always appreciated, however, that this would require fundamental 
changes in the constitution of the eurozone. A key conceptual difference between the 
eurozone and the US (or other nation-states) is that in the latter case the government 
can issue assets that have zero default risk because of ‘fiscal dominance’: the 
government could always order the central bank to ‘print’ the money needed to service 
the public debt. That is not the case in the euro area, where the ECB has been explicitly 
prohibited, by law, from financing (national or EU) public debt. The experience of Greece 
shows that no individual national government could ever hope to monetise its debt 
                                                                                                                                   
securities and covered bonds, which is a larger set than Pfandbriefe-style securities, strictly 
speaking, but with similar characteristics.  
18   As can be inferred from Figure 13, even lumping together the two significant AAA-rated 
governments in Europe (Germany and France) and adding the covered bonds issued in those two 
countries, one arrives at a ‘market’ of only about a quarter that of the US market for quasi-risk-
free assets. 16 | ALCIDI, DE GRAUWE, GROS & OH 
 
through the ECB; and in practice it would also be close to impossible for a coalition of 
many member states to force the ECB to do this. On the one hand, the textbook notion 
of a ‘riskless’ asset thus cannot be applied directly to the case of the euro area. On the 
other hand, it is necessary to recognise that in the case of the US, the fact that the US 
Treasury could always impose debt monetisation on the Federal Reserve eliminates the 
explicit risk of default, but neither the risk of inflation nor ultimately that of ‘implicit 
default’ in the event of hyperinflation. 
 
Box 2. Might the issuance of Eurobonds change the picture? 
One of the questions that arises is whether the creation of a single market for euro-area 
government bonds, i.e. a Eurobond market, could help overcome at least some of the obstacles 
to currency diversification and affect the supply of reserves.* 
The creation of a Eurobond should result in the unification of the currently fragmented market 
for European public debt. Bonds of the same coupon and maturity would be both 
indistinguishable and interchangeable in secondary markets irrespective of the issuing country. 
The creation of a common Eurobond has been on the table since the creation of the euro but it 
has never seen the light of day. In good times, its cost has always been seen as too high and in 
bad times the perceived benefits have never seemed large enough. More recently, however, 
alternative proposals for Eurobonds have been made and the current debt crisis and the 
financial stabilisation mechanism may give momentum to these ideas. Indeed the first step 
towards the unification of the European markets for government debt securities and the 
issuance of a common Eurobond could be seen in the set-up and implementation of the ESM.  
The EFSF will issue Eurobonds to collect necessary funds to extend loans to troubled countries. 
Hence, it represents a step towards the creation of such a common market for this kind of 
security and a test before the international markets.  
Five theoretical proposals regarding the characteristics and the scope of a future Eurobond have 
been made. They are summarised in a table in Appendix 1. The basic idea about how a 
Eurobond could be put in place is more or less the same in all the proposals. But the exact 
method of implementation varies and the Institut Montaigne in particular takes a very different 
approach from the other four proposals. 
It is proposed that Eurobonds are issued by a central issuing authority and each bond issue will 
be collectively guaranteed by the euro member states. The maximum amount of debt to be 
issued in Eurobonds is restricted to 60% of GDP, thus putting an upper limit on the size of the 
emerging Eurobond market. National sovereign-debt markets would continue to co-exist 
alongside the Eurobond market and they would be used for additional borrowing. The credit 
ratings of debt issued in national markets would be country-specific. The advantages of a 
common bond market are expected to be manifold, the most important being the expected 
increase in liquidity and the resulting attractiveness of the euro as a reserve currency. 
 
* Note that traditional ‘Eurobonds’ have been traded in financial markets for a long time. Issued by private 
enterprises with a good credit standing, governments and supranational entities, they are bonds that are 
denominated in a currency not native to the country where they are issued (e.g. Euroyen bonds or 
Eurodollar bonds). The term ‘Eurobonds’ in the present context refers to the issuance of European public 
debt denominated in euros by the euro member states in a common market. 
 
Still, for the time being an important issue is where the bulk of the assets will come from 
that are necessary to meet the coming demand for reserves.
19 More specifically, if the US 
                                          
19 The time horizon for which the special drawing rights, viewed as a super-currency, could play 
such a role seems more distant. Among others, see Sabucchi & Driffill (2010). THE FUTURE OF THE EUROZONE AND GOLD | 17 
 
deficit is contained from now on while emerging countries keep piling up reserves at a 
pace close to their (growing) current account surpluses, where will the missing deficits be 
found and what kinds of assets – safe or risky? – will be issued to finance them?  
The shortage of supply may increase the attractiveness of gold as an alternative reserve 
asset and even more so if liquidity in euro area markets diminishes (as it has done over 
recent months). Table 1 shows that while it is difficult to estimate the exact volume of 
trading in gold it is likely to be higher than most euro-area government securities,
20 
which are the main vehicles for Asian central banks to invest in euros. The gold market is 
highly liquid and thus potentially offers a hedge against the drying-up of liquidity that 
follows economic and financial distress. 
Table 1. Average daily trading volumes in 2009 (US$ billions) 
Assets US$  billions 
UK gilts   28.8 
German government securities  25.9 
US federal agency securities (primary dealer activity)  77.7 
Gold traded OTC and settled in London   59-159 
Japanese government bonds   288 
US treasuries (primary dealer activity)   407.9 
Note: OTC stands for over the counter. 
Source: Dempster (2010). 
4.  Scenario-building: Driving factors and forces  
The eruption of the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone has generated a lot of 
uncertainty about the future of the eurozone and the euro itself. Of course, the degree of 
uncertainty increases with the length of the time horizon as the institutional framework 
may change in a fundamental way and it is difficult to guess how the politics of the 
monetary union might evolve. Over the short run (two to three years), deep institutional 
reforms (like fiscal union) are unlikely to materialise and the main drivers behind our 
observations are economic in nature.   
This study uses a scenario approach as the explanatory method to illustrate ‘visions’ 
about the future of the euro area and to consider the implications for the gold market. 
The analysis aims at fleshing out four baseline scenarios that result from the combination 
of economic factors, transmission mechanisms and processes. Once the factors are 
identified, we elaborate on the way they interact and contribute to defining the different 
scenarios. In a second stage, the possible effects of euro area events on the global 
economy are discussed. This second-round evaluation is necessary to the extent that 
eurozone events can indirectly affect the gold market by impacting global variables or 
inducing changes in the behaviour of global actors. 
In our view, five main factors determine the possible scenarios: 1) the situation in 
financial markets will be crucial to determining the probability of a eurozone break-up; 2) 
external demand and 3) exchange rate developments will affect the degree of economic 
recovery; and lastly 4) fiscal and 5) monetary policies, which now have little room for 
action, will contribute to shaping market confidence and longer-term risks. These five 
factors are discussed below. 
                                          
20 See Dempster (2010) for more discussion on gold as a strategic reserve asset. 18 | ALCIDI, DE GRAUWE, GROS & OH 
 
Financial markets  
On the wave of US experience, 91 European banks agreed to publish their capacity to 
face an adverse scenario. This number includes not only large cross-border banks but 
also smaller banks, such as Spanish savings banks (cajas de ahorros) and the German 
regional Landesbanken (see Box 3 for more details). 
 
Box 3. Stress tests of European banks 
The table below shows the exposure of the five core euro-area countries with the largest 
banking systems. The table shows not only the level of exposure reached by the end of 2009 
but also the extraordinary rates of growth of lending to peripheral Europe, which grew by close 
to or over 500% in the case of Greece, Spain and Ireland. These data are telling for the simple 
reason that experience shows that very high rates of credit growth are followed by very high 
loss rates. It is unlikely that banks could suddenly be able to find so many high-quality 
borrowers in southern Europe. 
Table B3.1 Intra-euro-area banking exposure, core euro-area banks’ holdings of GIPS
* debt  
  
1999 Qtr 4 
(US$ 
billions) 
2009 Qtr 4 
(US$ 
billions) 
Change in 
1999–2009 
(%) 
Greece 24  141  491 
Ireland 60  348  481 
Italy 259  822  217 
Portugal 26  110  320 
Spain 94  613  554 
GIPS 204  1,212  495 
GIPS + Italy  463  2,033  340 
* GIPS refers to Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. 
Notes: The core euro area is Germany, France, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands. 
Source: BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics, June 2010.  
This calculation was the key reason it proved possible to obtain an agreement at the level of the 
European Council to publish the stress test results of the 25 largest, systemically important 
institutions.
1) Given the positive reception to this first step in the markets, the number of banks 
whose stress test results were to be published later grew to 91, covering about two-thirds of 
the entire EU banking system. A contributing factor in this sudden conversion to transparency 
will have been, of course, that European policy-makers were slowly learning from their earlier 
mistakes, which had been to remain consistently ‘behind the curve’. 
The real question is whether the stress tests just represent a tactical victory or if they also 
signify a strategic shift in EU policy-making. 
Some elements are encouraging but market participants are not fully satisfied by some 
assumptions and are sceptical about an insufficient capital injection predicted by the results. A 
crucial element in establishing the credibility of any stress test is the severity of the stress that 
is applied to a bank’s balance sheets. Regarding sovereign risk, the supervisors promised to 
apply a severe test, but the sovereign risk shock did not represent a severe deterioration of 
market conditions as compared with the situation observed in early May 2010.
2) 
The further conditions are, of course, that governments force institutions whose weakness has 
been revealed by the tests to recapitalise quickly and that public funds are made available for 
those institutions unable to raise new capital on the markets. It remains to be seen, however, 
whether the funds and the political will to do this will be available when needed. 
 
1) European Council, Conclusions of the European Council, EUCO 13/10, Brussels, 17 June 2010 
(http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/pdf/council_conclusion_17_june_en.pdf). 
2) Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), “CEBS’S Statement on Key Features of the EU-wide 
Stress Test”, CEBS, London, 7 July 2010 (http://stress-test.c-ebs.org/documents/Summaryreport.pdf). THE FUTURE OF THE EUROZONE AND GOLD | 19 
 
The main purpose of these tests is to reduce uncertainty over the risk exposure of 
eurozone banks by identifying where potential losses would arise. Yet for this approach to 
work two conditions must be fulfilled. The first condition concerns the ‘significance’ of the 
tests. Tests should be transparent about the assumptions and credible. Credibility 
requires ‘enough stress’ included in terms of possible losses and a macroeconomic 
environment that is not too benign. The second condition is the existence of an 
appropriate mechanism of capital injection if banks that were directed to raise equity 
levels were not able to do so. The fulfilment of both conditions would help to reduce 
uncertainty and bring markets back towards normality. On these grounds, the best 
scenario for the eurozone could materialise.  
Yet if neither of these two conditions is met because the assumptions (growth, 
unemployment, risks, etc.) are too generous or a convincing re-capitalisation strategy 
does not exist, the situation could deteriorate quickly and represent fertile ground for a 
break-up scenario for the monetary union. If the two conditions are only partially met, 
two in-between scenarios could materialise. The differences between the two scenarios 
would also be shaped by interactions with other factors. 
Exchange rate and global growth 
Given the situation in financial markets, the exchange rate could play an important role 
as a source of growth, at least for some countries of the eurozone. 
Over the short term, it seems quite unlikely that a significant appreciation of the euro 
with respect to the dollar or other currencies would occur. In principle, this could be good 
news for the eurozone economy. That being stated, there is no clear consensus in the 
literature on the variables that systematically explain export developments in the 
eurozone. Notably there is no consensus on the role played by the nominal exchange rate 
and there are no robust estimates of the elasticity of exports to the exchange rate.  
Figure 14 shows a positive relation between the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) 
of the euro and the volume of euro area exports over the period 2000–10 (May). At the 
same time, the dispersion is quite high (especially in the range of 100-120), making it 
difficult to precisely forecast the effect of exchange rate depreciation on exports. 
Figure 14. Nominal exchange rate and exports in the euro area 
 
Source: ECB (Statistical Data Warehouse). 20 | ALCIDI, DE GRAUWE, GROS & OH 
 
Nonetheless, the significant fall in the nominal exchange rate and the adjustment in 
terms of competitiveness induced by the crisis seem to suggest that some countries 
could enjoy growing export demand. In terms of magnitude, important elements that will 
make a difference are the nature and the drivers of the global recovery. If improvements 
in global demand come from Asian industries in the form of investment goods, 
competitive and export-led economies like Germany and to some extent Italy are likely 
to enjoy a boost in growth. 
Fiscal policy 
Across the eurozone, all countries are implementing restrictive fiscal policies in order to 
consolidate the position of domestic public finances. As a result, governments will not be 
able to stimulate growth. On the contrary, negative effects from fiscal retrenchment on 
economic growth are likely to materialise.  
At least in theory, there are reasons to believe that fiscal consolidation could affect 
expectations so as to offset its negative contractionary impact. Credible and consistent 
fiscal consolidation could be interpreted as reducing government borrowing needs in the 
future and a reason for increasing consumption. Moreover, if the consolidation were to 
affect risk premia on government bonds, this could have a positive effect on the cost of 
borrowing for the private sector in international markets.
21  But these kinds of effects 
could reasonably appear only over the longer run: given expectations of a long period of 
sacrifice ahead, the share of consumers who discount the future effect of the fiscal 
retrenchment (the so-called ‘Ricardian effect’) is likely to be low in the short run. All 
these elements together would indicate that fiscal consolidation would give rise to a 
negative short-term impact on real GDP growth.
22  
Monetary policy 
Monetary policy has been very active in responding to the crisis. The European Central 
Bank has intervened by providing liquidity to the banking system and even by purchasing 
government bonds in the secondary market. The interest rate is now at the zero lower 
bound and the usual transmission mechanisms of monetary policy are currently out of 
service. Despite the loose monetary policy and the large amount of credit provided by 
the central bank, credit conditions are still very tight for banks and the private sector. As 
shown in Figure 15, while the narrow money supply (M1) is increasing hand in hand with 
the balance sheet of the bank,
23 the broad money supply (M3) has stagnated.  
With short-term interest rates near zero and M3 independent of M1 changes, central 
banks’ scope for conventional action is limited and unconventional action may be less 
effective than one might expect. In the short run, inflation expectations are likely to stay 
low and the main active role of the ECB will be to contribute to financial stability rather 
than macroeconomic stability.  
                                          
21   There is a correlation between the risk premium paid by governments’ borrowing in the 
international financial markets and the cost of borrowing of the private sector (see Gros, 2010b).  
22 Another element to consider is the feasibility of fiscal policy. Peripheral countries are required to 
implement draconian, permanent fiscal cuts that could be difficult to achieve. Past experience with 
fiscal adjustment suggests that in principle it can be done (see Alcidi & Gros, 2010). At present, 
however, the fiscal starting position of some countries is especially precarious and the confidence 
in the sustainability of public finances is so low that it will be a very painful process.  
23 As a consequence of the exceptional measures adopted by the ECB to provide liquidity to the 
financial system since the start of the crisis, the balance of the bank has increased significantly: 
between September 2007 and June 2010, total assets have gone from €1.2 trillion to €2.1 trillion.  THE FUTURE OF THE EUROZONE AND GOLD | 21 
 
Figure 15. ECB: Narrow and broad money 
 
Source: ECB (Statistical Data Warehouse). 
5.  Possible scenarios for the eurozone 
5.1  Eurozone dream scenario 
The dream scenario for the eurozone would be one in which the crisis is overcome and 
divergences among the members of the union move towards a convergence path. 
As explained above, a precondition is that the bank stress tests deliver an unambiguous 
picture of the state of the industry and that a clear recapitalisation strategy at a 
European level emerges. These results combined with credible fiscal-adjustment 
programmes in vulnerable member states would re-establish confidence in the eurozone. 
Financial markets would calm down and both government bond markets and the credit 
market would get back to normality (a significant fall in volatility). A weak euro can 
further contribute, together with a nice global recovery and strong global demand, to 
growth.  
For convergence across the union to materialise, a wage adjustment in Europe should 
occur. With a gradual unwinding of the imbalances within the euro area taking place, a 
rather benign scenario could be imagined. The key element is the trend in German 
wages. It is often argued that excessive wage moderation by German trade unions was 
the main reason Germany has gained about 20% in competitiveness as measured by 
relative unit labour costs since the start of the economic and monetary union (EMU). Yet 
this view is contradicted by the fact that the relationship between wages and 
unemployment in Germany has been remarkably stable over recent decades. Moreover, 
some simple calculations provided in Box 4 show that the key driver of German export 
performance has been the huge increase in domestic demand in the part of the euro area 
that is now under pressure. This finding implies that the current account imbalances 
within the euro area could be corrected rather quickly if there is a reversal in the relative 
growth rates of domestic demand.  
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Box 4. Drivers of the German current-account deficit, 2000–06 
In the year 2000, Germany’s exports (goods plus services) to the rest of the eurozone were 
worth slightly less than €400 billion. With demand increasing in this market by 25%, even 
without any change in competitive positions, Germany’s intra-area exports would increase by 
around €100 billion by 2006. Germany’s imports from the eurozone were also worth about €400 
billion in 2000. With German domestic demand increasing by 5% over the period considered, 
one would expect Germany’s eurozone imports to increase by only €20 billion. Hence, from 
changes in domestic demand alone, one could expect an improvement in the German trade 
balance vis-à-vis the eurozone of around €80 billion. Given that the observed increase in the 
overall trade balance between 2000 and 2006 amounted to around €125 billion, one could 
conclude that the sluggishness in German domestic demand, abstracting from intra-area 
changes in terms of price and cost competitiveness, can explain about three-quarters of the 
observed change in the trade balance. 
Over the period taken here, the trade balance of the eurozone remained in rough balance. This 
implies that Germany’s balance must have improved whereas that of the other members of the 
eurozone must have deteriorated. Assuming that the distribution of the increase of overall 
eurozone imports across member countries was in line with national domestic demands and that 
exports to the rest of the world rose by the same percentage everywhere (since all countries, 
Germany and the rest of the eurozone, faced the same demand conditions), Germany’s trade 
balance should have improved by another €35 billion.*
 The total increase in the German trade 
balance that one can calculate ‘mechanically’ from the weakness in domestic demand is thus 
around €115 billion, almost equal to the observed value. This suggests that the increase in the 
German trade surplus between 2000 and 2006 can be explained almost fully by differential 
movements in domestic demand and that changes in price and competitiveness have played 
only a minor role in producing intra-area divergences.  
 
* Calculations for trade with the rest of the world (RoW): German imports from extra-EU countries were 
about €350 billion in 2000; given the increase in German domestic demand of a little over 5%, one would 
thus expect an increase in German imports from the RoW of a little less than €20 billion. The rest of the 
eurozone imported a bit less than €500 billion from the RoW in 2000; with an increase in domestic demand 
of close to €500 billion, one would expect an increase in imports of about €140 billion. The overall increase 
in eurozone imports should therefore have been around €160 billion. The exports of the eurozone must have 
increased by the same amount since the eurozone’s trade balance did not change much over the period 
considered here. The increase in overall eurozone exports should be distributed between Germany and the 
rest of the eurozone in proportion to their respective initial levels of exports (of goods) to the RoW, i.e. 
roughly in the proportion 200/650. This yields an increase in exports to the RoW for Germany of about €55 
billion (160*200/650). For Germany, the difference between the increases in exports and imports thus 
amounts to 35 (billion euros), if one just considers trade with the RoW. 
 
As shown in Figure 16, for 2010 the European Commission forecasts that the growth rate 
of domestic demand of Germany will largely outpace the rates of Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain (collectively referred to as ‘GIPS’). In 2011 when demand growth is 
expected to turn positive in the peripheral countries, the latter will still only be half that 
of the German rate.  
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Figure 16. Domestic demand growth rates 
   
Notes: Domestic demand is at constant prices (2000) and excludes stocks.  
Sources: European Commission services (AMECO) and authors’ calculations. 
What do these two elements imply for the future? 
So far, the crisis has not led to an increase in unemployment in Germany. Moreover, 
consumption has also been remarkably stable, and actually increased in 2008. Domestic 
demand has fallen because of a sharp drop in investment. Should investment recover, 
the stage would thus be set for a relatively strong performance of the German economy 
over the next few years. The German positive cycle has traditionally been started by an 
increase in exports, which has then led to more investment, with consumption following 
only at a later stage. Robust growth in emerging markets, with their vigorous demand for 
the kinds of investment goods German industry is producing, would also help set the 
stage for such a cycle in Germany. Unemployment is projected to decline only rather 
slowly next year, but if the upswing in the rest of the world is strong enough and the 
level of the euro remains favourable, the outcome might well be much better than 
anticipated. In 2011 German unemployment might already reach the level at which the 
past relationship between wages and unemployment suggests that wages should start to 
increase materially. It is clear that it will take many years before the GIPS countries can 
regain the competitiveness they lost over the first decade of EMU. Still, the pessimism 
about the economic prospects of these countries has also been predicated on the idea 
that German wages would not increase at all, implying that convergence would solely 
materialise through cuts in nominal wages, which are always extremely difficult.  
5.2  Muddling-through scenario 
Assuming that the stress tests only get half marks and do not fully deliver the expected 
identification of all the potential losses but help shed light on the main swathes of 
European banks, and that the necessary equity injection is guaranteed, there are 
grounds for avoiding the disruption of the monetary union and even a double-dip 
recession if global demand continues to recover. The latter is a necessary condition, even 
if not sufficient, for growth to pick up. If the exchange rate is relevant in determining 
exports, the euro’s depreciation could be the watershed between the muddling-through 
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The nominal exchange rate of the euro has been depreciating sharply in recent months: 
as shown in Figure 17, since its peak in October 2009 the euro has fallen in nominal 
terms by more than 11% vis-à-vis its 21 major trading partners and more than 17% vis-
à-vis the US dollar. If these trends are not reversed in the coming months, growth can 
turn positive in the euro area, even if not very strongly so.  
Certainly this requires that global demand recovers sufficiently so that the expansion in 
exports is able to offset the negative growth effect of fiscal retrenchment. There seems 
to be little doubt that fiscal austerity can positively affect growth in the short run since 
non-Keynesian or expectation effects of fiscal consolidation are unlikely to materialise 
during the next two to three years. According to some estimation,
24 fiscal  austerity 
measures could affect GDP growth by as much as -0.4% in 2010 and -0.2% in 2011. 
Figure 17.  Nominal effective exchange rate of the euro and the US$/€ exchange rate 
(1999=100) 
 
Source: ECB (Statistical Data Warehouse).  
How realistic is the expectation that a weak euro can boost exports in a significant way? 
Competitiveness is what actually matters, and as mentioned earlier, in this respect the 
eurozone is characterised by a high degree of heterogeneity. 
Over the period 2000–08, partly because of the strong nominal appreciation of the euro 
all the countries of the euro area experienced a loss of competitiveness, but on different 
scales. Then as a result of the crisis and the falls in demand and in the euro, all the 
countries have changed their pattern but only a few have been able to re-absorb the loss 
of competitiveness experienced earlier. Figure 18 shows that while Germany and Austria 
are already back to the level of competitiveness of 2000, other countries, namely Greece, 
Ireland and Spain, are well above that level.
25 
                                          
24  For instance, these include simulations from the QUEST III DGSE model of a permanent 
reduction in the deficit-to-GDP ratio by 1% of GDP in the EU-27 (European Commission, 2010).  
25 Even though the level of the Irish real exchange rate is still very high, Ireland is the country that 
has made the largest adjustments since the euro started to fall after its peak in October 2009. THE FUTURE OF THE EUROZONE AND GOLD | 25 
 
Figure 18.  Change in the real exchange rate by country (real harmonised 
competitiveness indicator unit labour cost deflated) 
 
Note: Positive values imply that in 2010 the real exchange rate (RER) was higher than in 2000 and therefore 
the level of competitiveness was lower. 
Sources: Statistics from the ECB (Statistical Data Warehouse) and authors’ calculations. 
 
Under this scenario, in the short run the effect of the recovery may be quite uneven 
across the union, as differences across countries in the level of competitiveness could 
play an important role. Differences could also be exacerbated by the nature of the global 
recovery. If global demand comes from Asia’s emerging markets in need of capital goods, 
Germany and other euro area exporters of industrial equipment may benefit with sound 
growth rates, but the situation of less-competitive countries would be left fundamentally 
unchanged. In this picture, both inflation and interest rates are likely to stay low and no 
major changes are expected for the euro. 
5.3  Double-dip scenario  
If the bank stress tests fail to restore market confidence, uncertainty will continue to 
govern market dynamics. Combined with a lack of confidence in European institutions 
and possibly a premature exit strategy from extraordinary monetary policy measures, the 
scenario of a double-dip recession becomes likely because a credit squeeze could 
materialise again. 
The key reason the economy nose-dived globally in the post-Lehman period is a 
combination of heightened risk aversion and a sharp fall in the availability of credit, both 
for consumption (a key issue in the US) and investment (a key issue for Europe). In 
response to the near freezing of financial markets, central banks switched to an ultra-
loose monetary policy, pushing interest rates to close to zero and providing banks with 
almost limitless liquidity. This policy was only partially successful. In the euro area, the 
loose stance of monetary policy was reflected in a surge in the monetary base (M1).  
But as shown in Figure 19, loans to non-financial corporations have trended downwards 
since early 2008. A significant amount of bank credit is trapped by financial 26 | ALCIDI, DE GRAUWE, GROS & OH 
 
intermediaries. Because of market uncertainty, banks are very reluctant to lend to each 
other and prefer to keep liquid money at the ECB despite the low interest rates.  
Figure 19. M1 and loans to non-financial corporations 
 
Source: ECB (Statistical Data Warehouse). 
 
The annual growth rate of loans to non-financial corporations declined in the first quarter 
of 2010 and the latest (April 2010) European survey on credit conditions suggests that 
the degree of tightness in market conditions has remained unchanged and is expected to 
persist during the next quarter.  
In the eurozone, the inventory restocking cycle has been a significant factor in boosting 
growth over the last year. Manufacturers aggressively cut inventories during the most 
acute phase of the recession, and as world demand has started to increase eurozone 
demand has also gradually grown. Yet because of the continuing high level of uncertainty 
over the recovery's shape and strength, it is not surprising that capital expenditure has 
failed to pick up so far. Gross fixed investment still fell in the first quarter of 2010. One 
reason might be that most industries are still operating at historically low utilisation 
rates. Another reason might be the perpetuating low level of available credit. An 
increasingly strained banking sector remains an important factor behind sluggish credit 
growth, with a knock-on effect on overall growth. This is especially true in Europe, where 
the non-financial sector heavily relies on the banking system as a source of financing 
(see Alcidi & Gros, 2009).  
The ECB seems to have played a key role in enabling the euro area economy to continue 
functioning despite a dysfunctional banking system. Figure 20 illustrates the intermediary 
role that the ECB is playing now. It seems quite clear that the balance sheet of the ECB 
has become the real interbank market. The very close correlation between the lending by 
the ECB (to banks) and the deposits that banks have at the ECB suggests that some 
banks deposit huge amounts at the ECB while others undertake huge refinancing 
operations from the ECB. Banks with excess liquidity prefer to park these funds at the 
ECB rather than lend them to other banks or firms that need liquidity, presumably 
because they do not trust the solidity of their potential counterparts. Between May 2008 
and May 2010, the ECB provided a total of slightly over €350 billion in additional total THE FUTURE OF THE EUROZONE AND GOLD | 27 
 
refinancing, but at the same time banks deposited slightly over €250 billion at the ECB.
26 
The total net financing of the ECB towards the banking system can be gleaned from the 
difference between the two lines i n  F i g u r e  2 0 :  i t  a m o u n t s  to only about €100 billion 
today. Taking the post-Lehman situation as the starting point (i.e. October 2008), one 
finds that the ECB has not provided any net new financing to the banking system.  
Figure 20. The ECB’s refinancing for banks and deposit facility 
 
Source: ECB (Statistical Data Warehouse). 
 
Which banks have surplus funds and which banks need refinancing from the ECB? The 
scarce available data suggest that the ECB is operating as a sort of ‘centralised 
counterparty’ to intermediate funds to the four GIPS countries that are in financial 
difficulties. According to Table 2, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain together have 
received over €200 billion in net financing from the ECB over the last two years. By 
contrast German banks have been providing funds by lending over €60 billion to the ECB. 
Thus, de facto the ECB is already operating as a ‘European Financial Stability Facility’.
27 
The central question going forward is whether the ECB can continue doing this on a large 
scale. If the ECB were to tighten its standards or otherwise ‘exit’ this policy, the banking 
sectors in the GIPS countries would immediately come under intense pressure, and 
probably with it the entire euro-area banking sector, precipitating the economy into 
another downturn. 
                                          
26 Banks have different claims on the ECB (or national central banks), but the two most important 
items are current accounts, which include the minimum reserves and tend to be rather stable over 
time, and the deposit facility. The latter was about zero before May 2008; since then it has been 
rising sharply (as shown in Figure 20) and it represents almost the total increment in banks’ 
deposits at the central bank.  
27 It is clear that the Greek banking system would have been bankrupt if it had not received about 
€80 billion (or 30% of GDP!) in net funding from the ECB. Moreover, this funding was provided at 
the official refinancing rate of the ECB, namely 1%, when market rates had been much higher, 
even before the market closed for the Greek government.  28 | ALCIDI, DE GRAUWE, GROS & OH 
 
Table 2.  Net financing provided by the ECB (and the Eurosystem) to banks across the 
euro area (in € billions) 
   Increase in lending by 
central banks to credit 
institutions 
May 2008–May 2010 
Increase in liabilities of central 
banks to credit institutions 
May 2008–May 2010 
Net 
lending 
ECB   353.8  330.8  23.0 
Belgium   -3.7  6.9  -10.6 
France 60.2  45  15.2 
France: 
Non-French MFIs 
- 5.9  -5.9 
Germany 21.6  83.1  -61.5 
Greece   83  4.4  78.6 
Ireland   55.7  5.6  50.1 
Italy   7.7  10.2  -2.5 
Luxembourg -17.9  9.7  -27.6 
Netherlands 54.5  58.2  -3.7 
Portugal   33.6  0  33.6 
Spain 70.5  14.9  55.6 
Total (sum of 
country data) 
365.2 243.9  121.3 
GIPS 242.8  24.9  217.9 
Note: The latest available data for France and Germany are from April 2010. MFI stands for monetary and 
financial institutions. 
Sources: ECB, national central banks and authors’ own calculations.  
If the eurozone falls into another recession, but the worst for the eurozone is avoided, 
one could expect no big change in the role of the euro as an international currency in the 
short run. Uncertainty will nonetheless remain elevated and the strength of the currency 
will continue to be questioned with some possible adjustments in favour of alternative 
assets. On the growth front, it is likely that this will not be good news for the rest of the 
world and some effects of the recession will spill over outside Europe, but emerging 
economies should be able to decouple.  
5.4  Doomsday scenario 
The government debt crisis has laid bare the inherent fragility of the eurozone. This 
fragility originates in the situation that while monetary policies are completely centralised 
by the European Central Bank, most other tools of economic policy have been kept in the 
hands of the national governments. Put differently, the fragility of the eurozone stems 
from monetary union not being embedded in a sufficiently strong political union. 
Consequently, the different national economic policies pursued by the member states 
lead to economic divergences that at some point become unsustainable. When a crisis 
erupts, the eurozone lacks the institutions to deal with it.  
The inherent fragility of the eurozone has led many observers to question its viability and 
to forecast its demise. How might a doomsday scenario for the eurozone develop? 
Starting from the present debt crisis, it is not difficult to see how a collapse of the 
eurozone could occur. A failure of the bank stress tests to deliver useful information 
about the current state of major banks and the lack of a clear plan of action to deal with 
the results could trigger the ‘mother of all crises’ in the eurozone. As a result of the 
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to avert an imminent default by the Greek government. The debt crisis, however, has 
now also taken hold of the market for Spanish government bonds. It is not unlikely that 
the Spanish government will have to commit large amounts of funds to save the Spanish 
banking system (mainly the cajas de ahorros). This in turn will trigger a massive sale of 
Spanish government bonds, leading to record-high borrowing costs for the Spanish 
government.  
These developments affect the banking system in the eurozone, and not just the 
southern banks. Banks in Germany and France are heavily exposed to southern 
government debt. The stress tests being conducted are unlikely to reveal the true nature 
of this exposure because of political manipulation. But this will not reduce the need to 
start massive amounts of recapitalisation of German and French banks, leading to further 
increases in government debt in these countries.  
Once this happens it will become clear that the recently created special-purpose vehicle 
will be insufficient and may lack credibility to deal with these multiple problems, for 
several reasons. First, the guarantee levels provided by the different national 
governments that will apply in individual bailout operations are unclear. Second, these 
uncertainties may lead to a failure to attain AAA rating. Third, and most importantly, 
there is a political problem lurking in the background. The bailout of southern European 
countries is intensely unpopular in Germany. When in addition the German government 
will be called upon to recapitalise the German banking system and to use massive 
amounts of funds to do so, it is likely that the bailouts of southern European countries 
will be even less popular. It will certainly test the cohesion of the German coalition 
government. It is not inconceivable that a second and much larger bailout operation 
involving Spain could lead to a break-up of the coalition. The political consequences could 
be grave. A new German parliament elected on a no-bailout platform may decide to order 
the German withdrawal from the bailout operations.  
S u c h  a  m o v e  w o u l d  l e a d  t o  a  c o l l a p s e  o f  several government bond markets in the 
eurozone. The costs and benefits of remaining in the eurozone would be changed 
fundamentally for a number of countries. These countries would be tempted to leave the 
eurozone, making it possible to ‘solve’ the excessive government debt burdens by 
inflation and devaluation.  
In this scenario, the eurozone would break up into different parts. Many possibilities 
arise. We analyse only one such scenario here, i.e. a shrinking of the eurozone to a core 
group of countries around Germany (say, the Netherlands, Austria and Belgium), with 
the other countries going their own way alone and reintroducing national currencies. 
In this scenario, the core eurozone would face strong appreciation of the currency, 
leading to a new recession and mounting budgetary problems. The economies of the core 
eurozone countries may actually experience deflation, as the recession, together with 
significant appreciation of the currency, reduces the general price level.  
The opposite is likely to happen in the breakaway countries. The currencies of these 
countries would depreciate dramatically. This would stimulate their economies 
temporarily but also reinstate inflation as a chronic feature.  
Figure 21 shows the long-run trends in government bond yields in the eurozone countries 
from 1993 to 2010. The period prior to the start of the eurozone was characterised by 
very large interest differentials but also by a growing convergence that set in after 
markets realised that countries would join the eurozone. The government bond crisis that 
started in 2009 marks renewed divergence among these bond yields, although this 
divergence remains small from a historical perspective. Nevertheless, if the eurozone 
were to break up, it is very likely that one would observe a return to the yield 
differentials seen during the 1990s, where differentials of more than 10% (1,000 basis 30 | ALCIDI, DE GRAUWE, GROS & OH 
 
points) were not uncommon. And in contrast to the 1990s, there would not be the 
dynamics towards convergence. 
Figure 21. Ten-year government bond rates in the eurozone 
 
Source: Statistics from the ECB (Statistical Data Warehouse).  
 
This scenario would imply unstable financial markets, negative growth prospects for the 
eurozone and likely spill-overs outside Europe. 
Great uncertainty would surround the ‘remains’ of the euro. On the one hand, 
international investors may prefer to abandon it completely, with a flight towards 
alternative currencies and assets. On the other hand, if a new eurozone made of the core 
EU countries led by Germany emerges, it may be seen as a credible and homogeneous 
monetary union. In this latter case, the new euro could still have the status of a reserve 
currency even if diminished compared with now.  
6.  Implications of the scenarios  
On the grounds of what has emerged from the economics of gold, developments in the 
eurozone will affect the gold market mainly through its impact on Asia – both Asian 
demands for jewellery and for official investment purposes – and through uncertainty in 
the advanced economies. 
Accordingly, in drawing out the potential implications of the four scenarios for the gold 
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in the previous sections would affect the rest of the world and induce reactions of the 
main world central banks. We define the ‘rest of the world’ as referring mainly to the US, 
China, India and the rest of emerging Asia. Not only are these economies major 
consumers of gold, but also they are the largest reserve providers and holders. 
Moreover, their economic impact on world economic growth would be the largest around 
the globe in the relatively near future of two to three years. Note that the interactions 
between Europe and the rest of the world follow an iterative process. Whatever happens 
in Europe affects the rest of the world and vice versa. For the scope of this report, we 
focus on the former. It is possible that the European impacts on the rest of the world 
would have repercussions back on Europe, but they would be of a second-order degree 
and often mixed with the factors originating from the source economies. 
This background provides an adequate basis on which to make an overall assessment of 
what each of the scenarios may imply for the gold market. Table 3 at the end of this 
section summarises the main findings. 
Eurozone dream scenario 
From the analysis in the previous section, it emerges that the ECB is playing a crucial 
role of ‘intermediation’ in the euro interbank market. It seems reasonable that if the best 
scenario were to materialise, financial markets would calm down, the interbank market 
would go back to normality and an exit strategy from unconventional policy measures 
would also be implemented by the ECB.  
In such a scenario, recovery should appear in the eurozone and also contribute to growth 
on a global scale, by restoring market confidence and supporting demand. The global 
recovery would stimulate industrial demand for gold and jewellery, but at the same time 
would likely reduce private investment in gold provided uncertainty is significantly 
reduced.  
The eurozone inflation rate has never been too worrisome. The brightest scenario might 
send eurozone inflation somewhat higher than the other ones, but it is expected to be 
relatively small chiefly because of the moderate growth prospects. Furthermore, firms 
across the world are still operating largely below capacity and unemployment is still high, 
which makes it quite unlikely that the output gap could close over the next two years. 
The relatively stable inflation prospects allow for stable European export prices. This is 
relevant because the major channels through which eurozone inflation or deflation 
pressures are transmitted to the rest of the world are euro exchange rates and exports.  
Hence, inflation risks would be low and inflation hedging would be unlikely to become a 
source of strong demand for gold. Of course, over the longer run, the outlook could 
change in accordance with the speed of the recovery and the laxity of monetary policy.  
As far as central banks’ demand for gold is concerned, this would be expected to 
continue to rise, especially on the part of large reserve holders. If the Chinese current 
account resumes its past trend on the wave of global recovery, global demand for 
reserves would increase again. The dream scenario would allow reserve holders to switch 
more easily to the euro, the attractiveness of which would increase accordingly. If 
eurozone financial markets were to develop in a positive way, this process would occur 
more rapidly and its magnitude would amplify. Under this scenario, the euro could 
strengthen, implying some depreciation of the dollar but without major shifts in the near 
term. Even assuming that euro-denominated assets could satisfy the bulk of increased 
demand, gold holdings would not be expected to decline, if anything they would rise as a 
source of portfolio diversification.  
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Muddling through  
The slow recovery of European economies portrayed in three of the four scenarios would 
of course not be a good signal for the global economy. But it is not likely that they would 
lead to a considerable slowdown of growth in the rest of the world. First of all, the 
financially stressed countries are neither the leading economies in the eurozone, nor 
highly open economies vis-à-vis the rest of the world. We might expect a lower level of 
GDP growth in the case of a worsening in the recovery process in Europe, but its 
international transmission would not be dramatic. Note that from the EU’s point of view, 
China is its largest export market, but from the Chinese point of view, its largest export 
market (on which much of China’s economic growth depends) is the US. In terms of 
imports, it is the other East Asian economies that China relies upon more than the EU. 
It is highly unlikely that financial market turmoil in southern Europe would induce a 
global economic recession. In particular, emerging markets are expected to grow at a 
much faster pace than Western countries, even if the growth rates observed before 2008 
are not likely to be repeated over the next two years. This implies that jewellery and 
industrial demand would remain high and significant increases in the supply of old gold 
scrap would be unlikely.  
In the muddling-through scenario, the positive growth in the eurozone, even if low, 
combined with a resolution to the financial crisis would suggest that the demand for the 
euro as a reserve currency may increase but not significantly so. This could also 
contribute to greater currency volatility (for both dollars and euros) and with it a slight 
rise in the demand for gold by both private sector and official investors.  
In this scenario, central banks would probably abstain from major actions, as inflation 
risks would be low and financial instability would disappear gradually.  
Double-dip 
If a double-dip recession were to occur in the eurozone, the high level of government 
debt could appear unsustainable in several member countries and increase the risk of 
further downgrades. This would imply that the adverse scenario assumed in the stress 
tests materialises. Consequently, several banks would urge capital injections and all of 
the banking system would be under pressure. The ECB could be forced to step in again to 
provide further refinancing and rehabilitate the government bond-purchase programme. 
This would put the euro under pressure, with more uncertainty from the side of reserve 
holders, and we would expect some limited withdrawal from the euro as a reserve asset. 
If in addition the US were to be in a situation of sluggish growth for the next two years, 
the Chinese current-account deficit would likely decline, which in turn would lead to a 
decline in the demand for international reserves.  
Overall, this would suggest that low growth in the reserve currency countries could 
increase the likelihood of further shifts towards gold, but in general the demand for 
reserves could lessen. In addition, high levels of uncertainty and falling returns on 
conventional investments should keep the demand for gold as an investment elevated. If 
emerging markets manage to decouple, the recession in the euro area should only 
partially affect industrial demand and jewellery as well as the supply of old gold scrap.  
Doomsday 
If the doomsday scenario were likely to appear, extreme measures to save the banks and 
governments would be undertaken by the ECB. The law does not allow the ECB to 
monetise government debt, but it is likely that the same measures that have been taken 
as a response to the Greek crisis could be implemented on a much larger scale. This 
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This extreme scenario could trigger bold reactions by the largest central banks. As far as 
the People’s Bank of China is concerned, policy changes are very difficult to anticipate in 
any scenario, but it seems reasonable that the increasing probability of a scenario with a 
falling euro and downgraded sovereign debt could act as a catalyst for the People’s Bank 
of China to reduce its holdings of euros. This implies that unless more flexibility in the 
renminbi exchange rate is allowed (if any, likely to be limited over the short term) and 
demand for reserves stops growing, the demand for alternative reserve currencies and 
assets like gold will increase. Of course, the collapse of the euro would worsen the 
mistrust in reserve currencies, including the dollar, and could further increase 
international pressures for reform of the global reserve system in the direction of a 
supranational reserve currency.  
The eurozone developments are unlikely to have a direct effect on US monetary policy. It 
nonetheless seems quite clear (also after the G20 summit in Toronto) that growth is a 
much higher priority in the US than in Europe, where inflationary risks are far more 
feared than stagnation. From this perspective and given the high levels of debt, it seems 
safe to say that loose monetary policy would persist for quite some time and inflationary 
risks are more elevated in the US than in Europe, but are still low over the short run. 
Domestic demand is still weak, and given the continuing high degree of risk aversion, it 
seems unlikely that another credit bubble could materialise. The evolution of the Federal 
Reserve’s balance sheet suggests that despite the fact that it has grown substantially 
(much more than the ECB’s balance sheet) over the last three years, its action has been 
extremely ‘targeted’: taking on bad assets (more than $1.1 trillion of mortgage-backed 
securities) but without evidence so far of significant quantitative easing. 
These factors imply that there is little danger of a steep rise in inflation and hence, there 
should not be a strong impact on gold demand as a hedge against inflation. 
If the eurozone were to break up, the real economic impact on the rest of the world 
would be limited as the core countries would likely remain in the eurozone. The 
prolonged low-growth period anticipated in Europe is not news: in 2010 alone the 
average real growth rate of the EU is predicted to be half that of the US.
28 The current 
stress in European financial markets and debt problems should weaken the euro. The 
present eurozone problems may affect the composition of global reserves. In contrast, in 
the doomsday scenario the euro is likely to lose in the short run. The middle scenarios 
would not likely bring much change to the current composition. 
In this scenario, it cannot be excluded that another crisis would hit the already-fragile 
advanced economies, and thus the risk of a deep recession would be high. As a 
consequence, deep uncertainty would prevail. Some previous eurozone countries would 
now face intense inflationary pressures. The countries remaining in the eurozone would 
likely be hit by a recession as a result of an appreciation of the euro. Exchange rates 
would be highly volatile, as the market would not know how to price the new currencies. 
Overall, the profound financial uncertainty created by this scenario would probably lead 
to higher demand for gold. 
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Table 3. Implications of eurozone scenarios for the rest of the world and gold 
 Global 
financial 
markets  
Global 
growth 
Global 
inflation 
US dollar 
exchange 
rates  
Reserve 
currency 
Gold market 
Dream 
scenario 
Positive Positive  Slightly 
up 
Weaker dollar  More euros  Stronger jewellery 
and industrial 
demand; weaker 
private investment 
demand  
Muddling 
through 
Not much, 
but rather 
positive 
Not much  Not much  Variable  Not much 
change 
Jewellery and 
industrial demand not 
much affected, nor 
investment 
Double-dip Not  much, 
but rather 
negative 
Not much  Not much  Stronger 
dollar 
Not much 
change  
Flight to safety: 
investment demand 
stronger and jewellery 
demand not much 
affected 
Doomsday   Negative, 
probably 
leading to a 
global crisis 
Negative   Slightly 
down  
Stronger 
dollar 
Fewer 
euros 
Flight to safety: 
investment demand 
dramatically stronger 
and jewellery demand 
somewhat weaker 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
7.  Conclusions 
The government debt crisis has exposed the fragility of the eurozone. After much 
hesitation, the eurozone authorities managed to respond by setting up a financial 
stability facility. Yet this has not prevented the sovereign debt crisis from spilling over 
into the vulnerable banking sector, with destabilising effects over the first half of 2010. It 
is too early to say whether the bank stress tests will reassure investors. It is clear, 
however, that developments over recent months have created some lasting uncertainty 
about the future of the eurozone.  
As shown in the first part of this report, macroeconomic conditions affect gold market 
dynamics in a complex way. The most relevant variables are growth (particularly Asian), 
inflation, global money supply and the US dollar exchange rate. Hence, it is mostly a set 
of factors outside the euro area that affect demand for gold. Nonetheless, there are 
important transmission mechanisms through trade links, knock-on growth effects and 
central banks’ behaviour that mean future developments in the eurozone are not neutral 
for the gold market.  
This report has analysed four different, future scenarios for the eurozone, ranging from 
an optimistic one in which the eurozone fully recovers in the next two years to a 
pessimistic one in which the eurozone breaks up. We have also introduced two 
intermediate scenarios, a muddling-through and a double-dip scenario. We have 
subsequently analysed the implications of these four scenarios for economic trends 
(inflation and growth, exchange rates, current account balances and reserve holdings) in 
the eurozone countries and in the rest of the world. Finally, we have studied how these 
four scenarios, through their effects on macroeconomic developments in the eurozone 
and in the rest of the world, could affect the price of gold. 
As the main conclusions, we find that in the dream scenario recovery should appear in 
the eurozone and also contribute to growth on a global scale, by restoring market 
confidence and supporting demand. This should stimulate industrial demand for gold and 
jewellery, but at the same time it would likely bring down private investment in gold 
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reserves could increase and the euro could strengthen against the dollar. Even assuming 
that euro-denominated assets could satisfy the largest part of the increased demand in 
reserves, European debt markets remain widely fragmented and gold holdings are not 
expected to decline – if anything they may increase as a source of portfolio 
diversification. 
Under the muddling-through scenario, it seems unlikely that the financial market turmoil 
in southern Europe could induce a global economic recession. In particular, emerging 
markets are expected to grow at a much faster pace than Western countries, even if the 
growth rates observed before 2008 are unlikely to be repeated over the next two years. 
This implies that jewellery and industrial demand would remain high and a significant 
increase in the supply of gold scrap would seem to be precluded. A general sluggishness 
in the advanced economies could also contribute to greater currency volatility (for both 
dollars and euros) and with it a slight rise in the demand for gold by both private sector 
and official investors. 
The double-dip scenario suggests that the associated higher degree of uncertainty and 
weak economic performance in the reserve currency countries would keep the demand 
for private gold investment elevated and increase the appeal of gold as a reserve asset. 
But in general, demand for reserves could lessen as a consequence of smaller current-
account surpluses in emerging markets. Similar to the muddling-through scenario, it 
seems likely that even if the growth rates of key Asian economies decelerate, owing to 
weak demand from the US, growth would continue in this part of the world. Some of 
those economies would have to shift away from an export-led growth model but they 
have substantial domestic potential for high growth rates. Hence, the recession in the 
euro area should only partially affect gold industrial demand and jewellery. 
Lastly, as the doomsday scenario does not exclude another crisis hitting the already-
weak advanced economies, the risk of a deep recession could be high and unforeseeable 
developments could materialise. Because of the considerable financial uncertainty, this 
scenario would likely lead to higher demand for gold. 
Overall, given lingering slack in advanced economies, in the near term we do not foresee 
a resurgence in inflation, the fear of which was an important factor in gold demand 
during the 1970s and 1980s. Should inflation eventually surface, it will only do so after 
balance sheets have been repaired. If this is done through a gradual deleveraging by 
private and public sectors, excessive inflation fears can be avoided. At present, some 
risks of deflation exist in the US but Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has 
signalled in the past that the US will prevent this dangerous outcome from materialising 
by all means. Over the near future, motives other than inflation hedging are likely to be 
the main drivers of gold market dynamics. Growth in Asia’s emerging economies will 
certainly play an important role and it seems likely that events in the eurozone will affect 
it only partially. Uncertainty is another influential driver. Even if extreme events are 
averted, uncertainty is not likely to disappear over the short term and market confidence 
is still far from pre-crisis levels, which implies that the gold price could continue to trend 
upwards for a period underpinned by investment demand from both the private sector 
and official investors. Finally, even if the reputation of the euro as a reserve currency 
improves, the holdings of gold by central banks will not fall. On the contrary, if further 
concerns about sovereign debt arise some central banks will start to diversify away from 
the euro, thus making the dollar and gold, ceteris paribus, more attractive. 
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Appendix 1. Summary of Eurobond proposals 
  De Grauwe & Moesen 
(2009) 
Jones (2010)  Depla & von Weizsäcker 
(2010) 
Leterme (2010)  Bonnevay (2010) 
Proposal  Eurobond based on EIB 
equity shares 
Dual bond structure  Blue/red bond scheme  European debt agency 
(EDA) 
Increasing fiscal coordination 
between France and Germany 
Collective 
responsibility 
Collective guarantee 
according to equity shares 
in the EIB 
Collective guarantee  Collective guarantee (joint 
and several liability to 
ensure a AAA rating) 
Collective guarantee  Explicit and joint responsibility 
backed by tax revenues 
Issuing body  European institution (for 
instance, the EIB) or 
member states’ 
governments 
Central issuing authority 
(not specified) 
Member state governments 
would authorise bond 
issues and meet the 
resulting servicing 
requirements 
An independent stability 
council (ISC) supported by a 
secretariat with the 
necessary economic and 
fiscal expertise 
The ISC would prepare an 
annual proposal for the 
allocation of blue bonds, and 
governments of all the 
participating countries would 
vote on the proposal 
The EDA under the 
authority of the Ministry of 
Finance of the Eurogroup 
and the ECB, supported by 
the EIB acting as a 
secretariat 
An unspecified agency would 
issue Eurobonds and transfer 
the capital raised to the 
national treasuries according to 
a predetermined issuance 
timetable 
Features of 
the 
Eurobond 
Euro-area governments’ 
participation in the bond 
issue on the basis of equity 
shares in the EIB 
Interest rate (coupon): the 
weighted average (by EIB 
equity shares) of yields 
observed in national 
government bond markets 
at the moment of issuance 
The proceeds of the bond 
issuance would be 
distributed proportionally 
1) 
Governments would pay 
national interest rates on 
their respective parts of 
the bond 
Limits on the volumes 
issued: globally (max. 
60% of GDP) and in a 
given year (max. 3% of 
GDP) – “responsible 
borrowing” 
 
 
Government debt of up to 
60% of GDP issued in the 
form of a senior, common, 
European government bond 
(blue bond) 
Differentiated allocation of 
the blue bond borrowing 
quotas by country (60% of 
GDP for fiscally sound 
countries vs. a lower 
proportion of GDP for 
countries with a weaker 
fiscal position, with gradual 
eviction from the scheme 
possible) 
2) 
The EDA would take over 
existing debt titles and 
issue new titles as agreed 
by ECOFIN and the 
Eurogroup 
Existing debt: the EDA 
would differentiate among 
debtors – differences in 
interest rates would reflect 
the differences in the credit 
rating of member states 
and maturing old debt 
would be replaced by new 
titles with a uniform 
interest rate 
New issues would benefit 
from a uniform interest 
rate 
First phase of the introduction: 
strictly Franco–German, 
financing common long-term 
investment projects – 
Obligations Assimilables du 
Tresor (OATs), Bunds and 
Eurobonds would co-exist on 
capital markets, with the 
residual value of national 
securities reduced every year 
Second phase: still Franco–
German, with a progressive 
increase in the number of 
budgetary items financed by 
the Eurobond (an increase in 
budgetary coordination) 
In the long run: introduction of 
the Eurobond in other member 
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Excessive 
borrowing 
No information about the 
possible interaction of 
Eurobond and national 
bond markets 
National sovereign bond 
issues – rating and price 
would vary from country to 
country 
“Red bonds” – national 
sovereign bond issues for 
debt exceeding 60% of GDP 
as junior national debt 
National sovereign bond 
issues if the deficit level 
exceeds the deficit target 
In the long run: coordination of 
budgets would eliminate the 
necessity for domestic 
sovereign papers 
Advantages  Reduction in the free-riding 
incentive 
Easier and cheaper access 
to financing for countries 
facing high spreads 
Possibly increased liquidity 
in the market if it is 
sufficiently sized 
Meets the desire for safety 
on the part of investors 
and financial institutions 
‘Pareto optimal’ proposal 
Increase in transparency 
A deeper and more liquid 
government bond market 
than a national one 
Lower borrowing costs 
Export of savings across 
the eurozone without 
accepting implicit 
sovereign risk 
Greater attractiveness of 
the euro as a reserve 
currency 
Limited scope of the 
Eurobond market 
compared with the ever-
expanding US government 
bond market might prove 
attractive 
3) 
Increase in liquidity (blue 
bonds) 
Lower cost of borrowing: 
from increased liquidity and 
from the pooling of 
borrowing 
Enhanced attractiveness of 
the euro as a reserve 
currency 
Enforcement of the 
Stability and Growth Pact 
Creation of a single 
European market for 
government debt (liquidity 
gains) 
The EDA would be an 
important symbol of a 
unified, European 
government bond market, 
improving the role of the 
euro and the world level 
EDA’s impact on the 
interest rate structure 
within the eurozone 
The Eurobond would guarantee 
permanent fiscal coupling 
between France and Germany, 
and the disappearance of 
asymmetric shocks, increasing 
the effectiveness of common 
monetary policy 
Default   Orderly default: 
renegotiation of country-
specific obligations before 
suspension of debt-
servicing payments on the 
common issue bonds 
Servicing obligations would 
be temporarily picked up 
by other member states 
(which would be 
reimbursed with interest 
once the crisis has passed) 
In case of default, blue debt 
would be senior and red debt 
would be junior: blue bonds 
would be affected by the 
default only to the extent 
that it is not absorbed by the 
red bonds 
  
1) It is possible that the interest rate obtained in the market could differ from the weighted interest rate.  
2) Countries not complying with the rule of sustainable debt levels will be ‘punished’ by reduced access to the Eurobond market.  
3) According to this proposal, the Eurobond market cannot exceed in volume a maximum of 60% of euro area GDP (the sustainable debt level as assumed in the Stability and Growth 
Pact).   
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Appendix 2. List of abbreviations 
 
BIS  Bank for International Settlements 
ECB  European Central Bank 
EDA  European debt agency 
EFSF  European Financial Stability Facility 
EIB European  Investment  Bank 
EMU  Economic and monetary union 
ESM  European Stabilisation Mechanism 
GDP  Gross domestic product 
GIPS  Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain 
GSE Government-sponsored  enterprise 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
ISC  Independent stability council 
NEER  Nominal effective exchange rate 
RER  Real exchange rate 
RoW  Rest of the world 
S&P Standard  &  Poor’s 
 